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JUDICIAL ETHICS-RECUSAL OF
JUDGES-THE NEED FOR REFORM
I. INTRODUCTION
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment guaran-
tees to every litigant the right to a fair and impartial trial.' To
insure this constitutional guarantee, a litigant is entitled to a new
trial if the record shows the judge did not conduct the first trial in
a fair and impartial manner.2 However, since a new trial costs the
litigants much more time and money and since the judge's bias
may not be apparent from the trial record, such a remedy is not
always sufficient. Therefore, most jurisdictions have enacted sta-
tutory procedures disqualifying a judge from presiding in a case
when there is reason to fear he is interested in the outcome or is
otherwise biased.'
As early as Coke's time, the common law maxim nemo debet
esse judex impropria causa-a man may not be a judge in his own
cause-unequivocally negated the power of a judge to hear and
decide a case in which he was interested.4 Early common law dis-
qualified a judge for only one type of interest-direct pecuniary
interest,5 but the English courts later extended the principle to
include cases in which the judge had a proprietary interest or even
a remote pecuniary interest.' Dictum in the 1865 case of The Queen
' U.S. CONST. amend. XVI; In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955); Tumey v.
Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
2 "Democracy must, indeed, fail unless our courts try cases fairly, and there
can be no fair trial before a judge lacking in impartiality and disinterestedness."
In re Linahan, 138 F.2d 650, 651 (2d Cir. 1943).
3Note, Disqualification of a Federal District Judge for Bias-The Standard
Under Section 144, 57 MINN. L. REV. 749 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Disqualifi-
cation for Bias].
In fact, the maxim that a judge may not be a judge in his own cause had such
force according to Lord Coke that even an act of Parliment could not vest power in
a man to try his own case, "for when an act of parliment is against common right
and reason, or repugment, or impossible to be performed, the common law will
control it, and adjudge such an act to be void." Dr. Bonham's Case, 8 Co. Rep. 113
6, 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (K.B. 1609). See Forest Coal Co. v. Doolittle, 54 W. Va. 210,
46 S.E. 238 (1903).
1 Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE L.J. 605, 609 (1947) [hereinafter
cited as Frank].
6 Dimes v. Proprietors of the Grand Junction Canal, 3 H.L. Cas. 759, 10 Eng.
Rep. 301 (1852).
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v. Rand7 prophesied the modem English rule which requires dis-
qualification when judges are substantially interested in a case,
whether pecuniary or not.8
While the early American common law adopted the existing
English common law grounds for disqualification-pecuniary in-
terest, relationship to a party, and previous involvement as counsel
in the case'-most American courts have refused to recognize a
common law right to disqualification for bias itself.10 Accordingly,
the common law has been modified by statute on both the state"
L.R. 1 Q.B. 229 (1866). This dictum was the first suggestion that a judge
would be disqualified because of bias itself, whatever its source, rather than because
of certain circumstances that had been recognized as causing bias. The court indi-
cated there would be disqualification "wherever there is a real likelihood that the
judge would, from kindred or any other cause, have a bias . . . ." Id. at 232.
8 The Queen v. Meyer, 1 Q.B.D. 173 (1875); Frome United Breweries Co. v.
Justices of Bath, [1926] A.C. 586; Cottle v. Cottle, [1939] 2 All E.R. 535 (Prob.
Div.). The existing standard for disqualification is "whether or not a reasonable
man, in all the circumstances might suppose that there was an improper interfer-
ence with the course of justice if the challenged judge sat." Id. at 537.
1 Note, Disqualification of Judges for Bias in the Federal Courts, 79 HARV. L.
REV. 1435 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Federal Courts].
10 State v. Beard, 84 W. Va. 312, 99 S.E. 452 (1919); Jones v. State, 61 Ark.
88, 32 S.W. 81 (1895); Clyma v. Kennedy, 64 Conn. 310, 29 A. 539 (1894).
"1 State enactments expanding and adopting the common law grounds for
disqualification are : ALA. CODE tit. 13, §§ 6, 7 (1959); ALASKA STAT. § 22-20-020
(1962); Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-409 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 22-113 (1962); CAL.
Cirv. PRO. CODE § 170.6 (Deering 1972); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-24 (1963);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-39 (1958); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 38.01, .02 (1974); GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 24-102, -111 (1971); HAWAU REv. STAT. § 601-7 (1968); IDAHO CODE §
1-1801 (1948); INr. ANN. STAT. § 9-1304 (1956); IowA R. Civ. P. 167; Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 23.230 (1971); LA. CODE CIv. PRO. ANN. art. 151 (West 1960); ME. Rcv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 14, § 1103 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 23 (1973 Replacement Vol-
ume); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 542.13 (1947); Miss. CONST. art. 6, § 165; Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 508.090, .100 (Vernon's Cum. Supp. 1975); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 93-901
(1964 Replacement Volume); Id. § 95-1709 (1969 Replacement Volume); NEB. REV.
STAT. §§ 25-410, 24-315 (1964); Nay. REy. STAT. §§ 1.230, .225 (1973); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:15-49 (1952); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 21-5-8 (1970 Replacement Volume);
N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 18; N.Y. JuDiciARY LAw § 14 (McKinney 1968); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 1-83 (1969 Replacement Volume); Omo REy. CODE ANN. § 2701.03 (Page
1954); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1401 (Cum. Supp. 1974); ORE. REy. STAT. §§
14.210, .250 (1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 111 (1953); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 8-3-
5 (1969); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-10 (1962); S.C. CoNsT. art. 5, § 6; S.D. COMPLED
LAws ANN. § 15-12-1 (1967); TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-201 (1955); TEx. CoNST. art. 5,
§ 11; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-7-1 (1953); UTAH CONsT. art. VIJI, § 13; VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 61 (1973); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-7 (1960 Replacement Volume); WASH, REV.
CODE ANN. § 2.28.030 (1961); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 51-2-8 (1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
261.06 (1957); Id. § 971.20 (1971); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 2-15 (1957).
[Vol. 77
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and federal levels 2 to enable litigants to disqualify biased judges
not covered by earlier law.
IH. WEST VIRGINIA
West Virginia, like the majority of states, adopted the early
common law grounds for disqualification and codified them.13 Al-
though the West Virginia statute" expanded the common law
grounds slightly,1" the procedure for disqualifying a judge is limited
to the hardened rules and specific categories established by com-
mon law. In fact, even the West Virginia court seems to be con-
fused as to whether the statute or common law controls. Due to the
narrow application of the statute by the courts and the ambiguous
definitions of terms included in the statute, many decisions deal-
ing with disqualification have been based on the common law even
though the statute may have been applicable to the facts."8
11 In 1792, the first statute governing disqualification was enacted. Act of May
8, 1792, ch. 36, § 11, 1 Stat. 278. It provided that a federal district judge was
disqualified when he was interested in the litigation or had been counsel for either
party. In 1911, section 455 of the Judicial Code expanded these grounds to include
pre-existing relationship or connection with a party and prior participation in the
case as a material witness. And in 1911, section twenty-one was added to the
disqualification statute which was reenacted as section 144 in 1948. So, today,
disqualification in the federal courts is governed by two statutes. 28 U.S.C. § 455,
§ 144 (1970).
'" W. VA. CODE ANN. § 51-2-8 (1966). "These statutory grounds seem to com-
prehend all the common law disqualifications." State v. Beard, 84 W. Va. 312, 316,
99 S.E. 452, 453 (1919).
' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 51-2-8 (1966) provides in its pertinent part:
[W]hen such a judge [circuit, criminal or intermediate] is a party to a
suit, or is interested in the result thereof otherwise than as a resident or
taxpayer of the district or county, or is related to either of the parties, as
a father, father-in-law, son, son-in-law, brother, brother-in-law, nephew,
uncle, first cousin, or guardian, or if, at the time of the institution of the
suit, or at any time before its final determination, he, his wife, or any
party or parties related to him in the degree hereinbefore specified, is a
stockholder, or officer, in any stock company or corporation which is a
necessary party to the proceedings, or if he is a material witness for either
party, he shall not take cognizance thereof unless all parties to the suit
consent thereto in writing. ...
1' West Virginia disqualifies a judge that has an indirect pecuniary interest
because he is a stockholder or related to a stockholder of a corporation involved in
a proceeding. Id.
"1 State v. Sams, 210 S.E.2d 916 (W. Va. 1975); Osborne v. Chinn, 146 W. Va.
610, 121 S.E.2d 610 (1961); Fahey v. Brennan, 137 W. Va. 37, 70 S.E.2d 438 (1952).
In none of these cases did the court refer to the statute even though it was, or
could have been applicable. Instead, the court relied upon the common law rules
3
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The present West Virginia law fails to provide a flexible, gen-
eral ground for disqualification of a judge for bias or prejudice. 7
Without such a standard, a litigant may be powerless to disqualify
a judge, even though actually biased, because the exact type of
facts required by the statute does not exist. As a result, the litigant
cannot invoke the statute to obtain recusal of a judge by a writ of
prohibition. 8 Therefore, the present statute is not a sufficient safe-
guard for a fair and impartial trial. The exclusive, narrow grounds
for disqualification and the complete lack of a general disqualifica-
tion for bias provision require a modification of the present West
Virginia law. Because the courts will not institute this reform,'"
legislative action is necessary.
III. RECUSAL OF JUDGES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
The first statute providing for disqualification of federal
judges, enacted in 1792,12 provided two grounds for disqualification
that were already contained in the common law-when the judge
was interested in the litigation"1 or had previously been counsel for
either party in the case. In 1911 this section was reenacted as
section 455 of the Judicial Code, and the grounds were expanded
to include prior participation in the case as a material witness and
pre-existing relationship or connection with a party.Y However, the
adopted by West Virginia.
17 "In the absence of express statutory provision, prejudice or bias on the part
of the judge which is not based on interest is not assignable as a ground for disquali-
fication . . . ." State v. Beard, 84 W. Va. 312, 316, 99 S.E. 452, 453 (1919).
,1 In Woodcock v. Barrick, 79 W. Va. 449, 91 S.E. 396 (1917), the court recog-
nized the fact that a judge may be biased in a case where the judges own attorney
may be a party in a case before him, but since these specific facts aren't included
in the statute or common law, the court could not issue a writ of prohibition
disqualifying the judge from the case.
" In fact, the court has positively stated, that "the Constitution and the legis-
lature" do not want the courts to add other grounds for disqualification. 84 W. Va.
at 316, 99 S.E. at 453.
1 Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 11, 1 Stat. 278. This statute applied only to
federal district judges until reenacted in 1911.
21 Interest in section 455, construed as the early English common law, must be
direct financial interest. Spencer v. Lapsley, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 264, 266 (1857).
28 U.S.C. § 455 (1970), formerly ch. 231, § 20, 36 Stat. 1090 (1911), provides:
Any justice or judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any
case in which he has a substantial interest, has been of counsel, is or has
been a material witness, or is so related to or connected with any party
or his attorney as to render it improper, in his opinion, for him to sit on
the trial, appeal or other proceeding therein.
(Vol. 77
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statute made it discretionary with the challenged judge to deter-
mine whether he would disqualify himself under those grounds.2
Section 455 also lacked a general provision for disqualification for
bias or prejudice.
Congress, recognizing the need to adopt a flexible, general
procedure for disqualifying judges for bias or prejudice, added sec-
tion twenty-one to the Judicial Code of 1911.24 The statute, re-
drafted in 1948 as section 1442 and still in effect today, permits a
litigant to disqualify a federal district court judge by filing an
affidavit alleging facts from which bias or prejudice may reasona-
bly be inferred. Section 144 was enacted as an answer to major
criticisms of section 455,26 the discretionary power given a trial
The statute, as enacted in 1911, applies to district courts, courts of appeals,
and the Supreme Court.
2 Coltrane v. Templeton, 106 F. 370 (4th Cir. 1901). See Frank, supra note 5,
at 609.
24 Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 21, 36 Stat. 1090 provided:
Whenever a party to any action or proceeding, civil or criminal, shall
make and file an affidavit that the judge before whom the action or
proceeding is to be tried or heard has a personal bias or prejudice either
against him or in favor of any opposite party to the suit, such judge shall
proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be designated in the
manner prescribed in section twenty-three, to hear such matter. Every
such affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that such
bias or prejudice exists, and shall be filed not less than ten days before
the beginning of the term of the court, or good cause shall be shown for
the failure to file within such time. No party shall be entitled in any case
to file more than one such affidavit; and no such affidavit shall be filed
unless accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record that such affida-
vit and application are made in good faith. The same proceedings shall
be had when the presiding judge shall file with the clerk of the court a
certificate that he deems himself unable for any reason to preside with
absolute impartiality in the pending suit or action.
"' 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1970). When the Statute was reenacted in 1948 as section
144, one of the few changes made as to add "sufficient" to the word "affidavit."
" Representative Cullop of Indiana, chief sponsor of section twenty-one (now
section 144), stated during the House debates:
Now it sometimes happens in the trial of such cases that courts do abuse
their discretion, and under the section here [section 455] it is left solely
discretionary with such judge. It must appear that in his opinion a cause
does exist . . ..
* . [Ilt ought not to be left to his discretion; and I submit that if he is
a conscientious man, he does not want it left to him. It ought to be taken
away from him, and taken away from him by the law.
46 CONG. REc. 306 (1910).
This amendment seeks to remove from the court that criticism; that
parties may have relief from judges in whom they have not confidence in
5
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judge to review a challenge to his impartiality, the restrictive
grounds available for disqualification, and the lack of a competent
general standard. 7 However, section 455 does include a broad re-
quirement that a judge disqualify himself if in his opinion his
participation would be "improper."' s
The statutory requirement of an affidavit stating the facts and
reasons for the belief that a "personal bias or prejudice" exists is
too indefinite regarding the grounds that are in fact sufficient to
require recusal under section 144.9 Interpretations in the federal
courts of these grounds restricted the meaning of the statute and
impeded its apparent goals." While initially, in Berger v. United
States, the Supreme Court held that section 21, later section 144,
empowered the trial judge to determine only the legal sufficiency
of the affidavit, not the truth or falsity of the charges, in deciding
whether recusal was appropriate," subsequent judicial decisions
their impartiality and freedom from prejudice, so that others may be
called to bear and determine the case and avoid the criticisms that now
exists on the part of litigants in courts in many instances.
Id. at 2627.
27 See Note, Disqualification of Judges, 86 HARV. L. REv. 736 (1973)
[hereinafter referred to as Disqualification]; Putnam, Recusation, 9 CoRNa I L.Q.
1, 10 (1923).
= 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1970). However, the statute fails to define what is "impro-
per," and the experience of federal judges who have disqualified themselves pro-
vides little help, because they rarely state their reasons for disqualifications.
It is important to note here that some West Virginia courts recognize this right
of a judge to disqualify himself if in his judgment it would be improper for him to
preside; it is not a statutory right. State v. Beard, 84 W. Va. 312, 99 S.E. 452 (1919).
See also Woodcock v. Barrick, 79 W. Va. 449, 91 S.E. 396 (1917). While adoption
of a statute such as section 144 would help alleviate many of the problems concern-
ing disqualification of judges in West Virginia, it, too, has its shortcomings as is
apparent from its failure to correct the problems of section 455.
n Ex parte American Steel Barrel Co. and Seaman, 230 U.S. 35, 43-44 (1913);
Ex parte Fairbank Co., 194 F. 978, 985 (N.D. Ala. 1912).
-" "But the clear Berger decision [see note 32 infra and accompanying text],
the clear statute, and its clear legislative history have not been followed in practice,
and the federal trial practice still does not provide a litigant with the automatic
change of venue to which he is apparently entitled upon filing an affidavit in good
faith." Frank, supra note 5, at 629. See also Disqualification for Bias, supra note
3, at 755. But see Parrish v. Board of Comm'rs of Ala. State Bar, 505 F.2d 12 (1974).
In Parrish, the court returned to the standards for determining the legal sufficiency
of the recusal affidavit provided under section 144, as determined by the Supreme
Court in Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22 (1921).
31 255 U.S. 22 (1921). In granting recusal to prevent a federal district judge who
had made strong remarks in the case condemning German-Americans from presid-
ing at the trial of German-Americans charged with espionage, the Court announced
6
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required a higher burden of proof as to bias." The lower federal
courts further disregarded the statute's purposes and the Berger
decision by restrictive interpretations of the personal bias or preju-
dice that the affiant is required to prove to gain recusal.3 They
have construed recusable bias so narrowly as to require the affiant
to show the judge dislikes him as a person.3' In fact, many courts
have held that neither bias against the affiant's cause nor identifi-
able prejudgments on the merits are sufficient to obtain recusal.35
Even more limiting are the holdings requiring the bias to have
developed during the present case, not during previous litigation,
for it to be a ground for the recusal of a federal judge.31 In United
States v. Grinell, the Supreme Court went so far as to confine the
scope of recusable bias to only that bias which the affiant can
connect to events occurring outside the courtroom.37 The federal
the following standard:
Upon the making and filing by a party of an affidavit under the provisions
of section 21 [predecessor of section 144], of necessity there is imposed
upon the judge the duty of examining the affidavit to determine whether
or not it is the affidavit specified and required by the statute and to
determine its legal sufficiency.
Id. at 32.
"[Tihe test of the affidavit's legal sufficiency should be whether the facts
alleged could reasonably lead to the belief that the affidavit says exists in the minds
of the plaintiffs." Parrish v. Board of Comm'rs of Alabama State Bar, 505 F.2d 12,
20 (5th Cir. 1974).
22 "It is true that some post-Berger cases have adopted a different test, one that
would virtually require that the facts-taken, of course, as true-are sufficient to
demonstrate a personal bias or prejudice in fact on the part of the trial judge for or
against one of the parties." Id. at 20. Some cases so holding are: Keoun v. Hughes,
265 F. 572 (1st Cir. 1920); U.S. v. Gilboy, 182 F. Supp. 384 (M.D. Pa. 1958). See
also Disqualification for Bias, supra note 3.
3E.g., Craven v. United States, 22 F.2d 605 (1st Cir. 1927); United States v.
Parker, 23 F. Supp. 880 (D.N.J. 1938); Jchnson v. United States, 35 F.2d 355 (W.D.
Wash. 1929).
14 E.g., Hogdon v. United States, 365 F.2d 679 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1029 (1966); Henry v. Speer, 201 F. 869 (5th Cir. 1913); Cole v. Loew's Inc., 76 F.
Supp. 872, 876 (S.D. Cal. 1948), rev'd on other grounds, 185 F.2d 641 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 340 U.S. 954 (1951); Saunders v. Piggly Wiggly Corp., 1 F.2d 582, 584
(W.D. Tenn. 1924).
31 E.g., Knapp v. Kinsey, 232 F.2d 458, rehearing denied, 235 F.2d 129 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 892 (1956); Denis v. Perfect Parts, Inc., 142 F. Supp.
263 (D. Mass. 1956); United States v. Valenti, 120 F. Supp. 80 (D.N.J. 1954). See
also Frank, supra note 5, at 630.
11 E.g., Knapp v. Kinsey, 232 F.2d 458, 466 (6th Cir.), rehearing denied, 235
F.2d 129, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 892 (1956).
384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966).
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courts under section 144 have limited recusable conduct to per-
sonal dislike of the affiant that arises from an extrajudicial source38
and, therefore, have made it applicable only to the narrowest of
circumstances.
Federal courts have also construed the requirement of a suffi-
cient affidavit to demand an affirmative showing of actual bias
before recusal would be granted.39 But the language of section 144
made possible the disqualification of a judge on the basis of facts
that would indicate the possible presence of bias." "A minority of
courts have construed the sufficient affidavit requirement liberally
and disqualified a judge when the affidavit revealed appearance of
bias on his part even though the judge may be impartial."4' The
bias-in-fact standard used by a majority of the courts requires that
the affiant prove bias by a preponderance of the evidence. Thus,
the facts alleged in the affidavit, necessarily accepted as true, must
satisfy the same minimum level required for proof of a fact. Such
a standard approaches a trial on the merits of the bias issue and
is not appropriate for the question of recusal.
Pfizer Inc. v. Lord" illustrates the shortcomings of section 144
and its adherence to the bias-in-fact standard. In that case, the
defendants in a multi-district antitrust suit filed an affidavit under
section 144 requesting the district court judge to recuse himself
because of eight alleged incidents of bias. Some of those were:
persuading the United States Department of Justice not to settle
the case, suggesting that if it did settle the action, it would be
permitting the defendants to "buy a monopoly," soliciting law
I In re Millman, 439 F.2d 412 (4th Cir. 1971); United States v. Garrison, 340
F. Supp. 952 (D.C. La. 1972); Bradley v. School Board, 324 F. Supp. 439 (E.D. Va.
1971); United States v. Beneke, 317 F. Supp. 1326, af'd, 449 F.2d 1259 (D.C. Minn.
1970).
n Disqualification for Bias, supra note 3, at 759. Actually, West Virginia re-
quires this on a petition for writ of prohibition. Fahey v. Brennan, 137 W. Va. 37,
70 S.E.2d 438 (1952). While the court stated the allegations of the petitioner must
be taken as true, it further explained the reason was because the judge did not
answer the allegations. The court stated, "[W]e simply say that when confronted
with charges well pleaded in formal pleadings, which he [the judge] has not an-
swered, so as to raise a factual issue bearing on his qualification or disqualification,
the charges must be taken as true . . . ." Id. at 47, 70 S.E.2d at 443.
40 Federal Courts, supra note 9, at 1447.
Disqualification for Bias, supra note 3, at 759. See Parrish v. Board of
Comm'rs of the Ala. State Bar, 505 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1974); Whitaker v. McLean,
118 F.2d 596 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
42 456 F.2d 532 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 976 (1972).
[Vol. 77
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suits against the defendants, accusing defendants' counsel of in-
structing his client to manufacture and "doctor" evidence, and
suggesting openly during the interrogation of a deposition witness
that he was evasive and lying. Yet the court, consistent with the
restrictive interpretations of section 144 by other courts, found that
defendants failed to establish "personal bias" or "bias in fact"
and, therefore, denied the motion because the affidavit was "insuf-
ficient" under the statute." The facts alleged in petitioners' affida-
vit, however, were sufficient to gain recusal under section 144 as
interpreted originally by Berger and under an appearance-of-bias
standard.
Section 144 of the Judicial Code, through restrictive judicial
interpretation, has become inappropriate as a general standard for
disqualification on the grounds of bias and prejudice. The adher-
ence to a bias-in-fact requirement for recusal, the restrictive inter-
pretation of bias itself, and the discretionary power left in the
judge against whom the bias is asserted limits its usefulness and
creates confusion.
IV. ABA CODE OF JuDicLL CONDUCT
Because the authority of the judiciary depends on public con-
fidence in the impartiality and well-reasoned foundation of judi-
cial decisions, any competent standard for the disqualification of
judges for bias must provide for disqualification whenever the pub-
lic may reasonably question the judge's impartiality." The court's
decision in Pfizer clearly illustrates that the present federal statu-
tory standards have failed to do this by allowing too much discre-
tion and by failing to set forth a general standard for disqualifica-
3 Although the court found the judge's adverse comments regarding petition-
ers' deposition witness "inappropriate, perhaps even unfair to the witness" and the
fact that "Judge Lord had misconceived his role vis-a-vis the settlements," the
court found such an exercise of discretion to be non-personal and, therefore, non-
prejudicial, even though the actions of the judge discouraging fair settlements
would "contravene the public interest." The court concluded that "the facts con-
tained in the affidavit falls short of showing the bias and prejudice necessary to
recuse." Id. at 539-44.
" Justice Frankfurter, recognizing that the authority of the judiciary rests
ultimately on public acceptability of judicial decision-making, indicated that au-
thority is undermined when judicial decisions are identified with the prejudice of
the decision makers. He stated, "[Tihe court's authority-possessed of neither the
purse nor the sword-ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its moral
sanction." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (dissenting opinion).
9
Sensabaugh: Judicial Ethics--Recusal of Judges--The Need for Reform
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2019
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
tion that can be followed." The ABA Code of Judicial Conduct"
remedies many of the problems inherent in section 144 and, there-
fore, would be a better, although not an ideal, model for a disquali-
fication statute.
The ABA Code of Judicial Conduct specifically deals with
disqualification of judges.47 It provides three separate grounds for
disqualification-financial or corporate interest, a case in which
the judge was a material witness or lawyer, and relationship to a
party. But these grounds are specifically stated to be non-
exclusive." This is necessary to allow the court to expand these per
" Under an appearance-of-bias standard, or even the Berger standard for bias,
the facts of Pfizer would have been sufficient to obtain recusal. The facts of Pfizer
and Berger are very similar, but the court reached opposite decisions because it
restrictively interpreted section 144 in Pfizer, but not in Berger.
11 The American Bar Association replaced the ABA Canons of Judicial Ethics
in August, 1972, with the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct which consists of seven
general canons of ethics accompanied by specific rules of behavior. However, the
Code, like the old canons, does not have legal force with federal judges.
" ABA CODE oF JuDICui CoNDuor, CANON 3C provides:
(1) A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited
to instances where:
(a) he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or per-
sonal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the pro-
ceeding;
(b) he served as lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer
with whom he previously practiced law served during such associa-
tion as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or such lawyer
has been a material witness concerning it:
(c) he knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary or his spouse
or minor child residing in his household, has a financial interest
in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding,
or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the
outcome of the proceeding;
(d) he or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relation-
ship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person:
(i) is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or
trustee of a party;
(ii) is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
(iii) is known by the judge to have an interest that could
be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;
(iv) is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material
witness in the proceeding ....
ABA CODE OF JUDIC-AL CoNDUcT, CANON 3C(1). In West Virginia only those
grounds established by the statute and common law are available for recusal even
though the judge may actually be biased. See State v. Beard, 84 W. Va. 312, 99
S.E. 452 (1919); Woodcock v. Barrick, 79 W. Va. 449, 91 S.E. 396 (1917).
[Vol. 77
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se rules for recusing a biased judge. More importantly, the ABA
Code establishes a general ground for recusal based on personal
bias or prejudice concerning a party or personal knowledge of dis-
puted evidentiary facts. The general test prescribed for disqualifi-
cation is whether the judge's impartiality "might reasonably be
questioned.""9 According to the drafters, the word "might" indi-
cates that a judge should be disqualified if the "reasonable man,"
knowing "all the circumstances," would have doubts about the
impartiality of the judge." The purpose of such a standard is to
guarantee not only that a biased judge would not participate but
also that no reasonable person would suspect that a judge is
biased. Obviously a neutral and detached judge is essential to a
fair trial and required by due process." The appearance test will
maintain public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary," pro-
vide greater assurance of a fair trial," and, by eliminating subjec-
tive speculation concerning the source and nature of a judge's men-
tal state, make the application of the standard easier.
The Code clearly defines the specific categories for disqualifi-
cation and explicitly requires disqualification for direct financial
interests if it could be "substantially affected" by the outcome."
With respect to the latter, however, the Code is somewhat uncer-
tain as to when such an interest requires disqualification. While it
does not have a specific test for disqualifying a judge for prejudging
the case, the Code's general appearance standard justifies such a
test. 5 Since prejudgment of the merits of a case creates a greater
danger of partiality, whenever a reasonable man could conclude
that the judge has already applied the law to the facts of the
particular case and reached a conclusion, disqualification would be
required.
The Code also specifically requires disqualification whenever
the judge has "personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts
' ABA CODE OF JUDICiAL CoNnuCr, CAON 3C(1).
" ABA CODE OF JuDiciAL CONDUCT, Reporter's Notes, at 60.
" Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971); In re Murchison, 349 U.S.
133 (1955); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
52 The Court indicates that since the strength of the judiciary rests upon public
confidence, "justice must satisfy the appearance of justice." Offut v. United States,
348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)
Disqualification for Bias, supra note 3, at 765.
"ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCr, CAON 30 (1)(c).
Disqualification, supra note 27, at 758.
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concerning the proceeding."'"5 This standard prevents a judge from
evaluating the legal significance of facts prior to trial and insures
that he will consider the facts as presented at trial or by the record
and not as he recalls them. The danger of viewing the facts differ-
ently from the record and creating a reasonable apprehension of
prejudice has already been recognized by the Supreme Court. 7
Although the ABA Code sets forth a much better general stan-
dard for disqualification because of bias or prejudice and contains
more detailed guidelines than section 144, it nevertheless has
shortcomings. The lack of a specific test for disqualification for
prejudgment on the merits, the lack of sufficiently defined proce-
dure for implementing the canon, the failure to specify when an
indirect financial interest might require recusal, and the discre-
tionary power left in the very judge whose impartiality is ques-
tioned to determine the adequacy of the affidavit alleging bias are
only some of the unresolved problems.
V. NEW STATUTE FOR DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES
There are two important considerations in comprising a gen-
eral test for the disqualification of judges in West Virginia. First,
the litigants must be assured a fair trial with an impartial judge, 5
and, second, the public confidence in the integrity of the judicial
process must be maintained. 9 These interests are best protected
by the adoption of an appearance test for disqualification of judges
for bias. The original drafters of section 144 and the ABA Judicial
Code of Conduct, Canon 3C both recognized the importance of
appearances."
A statute should include a preemptory system of disqualifica-
tion, similar to section 144, which would, upon the filing of an
affidavit alleging bias or prejudice, allow the judge to decide only
if the affidavit alleged facts sufficient to indicate the possible pres-
11 ABA CODE OF JUDIcL. CONDUCT CANON, 3C(1)(a). Although the facts will be
in issue only at the trial level, the provision is applicable to the appellate level when
a judge's extrinsic knowledge of facts could influence his judgment on the merits
of the issues.
'7 In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 138-39 (1955).
Osborne v. Chinn, 146 W. Va. 610, 614, 121 S.E.2d 610, 612 (1961).
", "It is the design of the law to maintain the purity and impartiality of the
courts, and to insure for their decision the respect and confidence of the com-
munity." Forest Coal v. Doolittle, 54 W. Va. 210, 227, 46 S.E. 238, 245 (1903).
10 See Federal Courts, supra note 9, at 1447; Disqualification, supra note 27,
at 745.
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ence of bias, but not allowing him to decide the truth or falsity of
those facts. Therefore, if the judge rules that there are sufficient
allegations to indicate an appearance of bias, the affidavit is le-
gally sufficient, and the judge cannot proceed any further. How-
ever, as provided by the present statute,"1 any rulings made prior
to the disqualification merely to advance the cause towards a final
hearing and not involving the merits of the case would not be
disturbed. If the judge does not disqualify himself in a case in
which the affidavit alleges bias or prejudice, a writ of prohibition
should lie to force the judge to be disqualified.2 While some courts
have suggested that appellate review is an appropriate remedy, 3
a provision such as prohibition is necessary to save litigants' time
and money and remove a major source of frustration and irritation
before the trial gets underway. 4
Opponents of a preemptory system of disqualification for ap-
pearance of bias argue that it would result in purposeful delay and
"judge shopping."" However, a study made during the first six
months of 196266 of the California preemptory system for disquali-
fying judges 7 indicated that the system did not cause serious prob-
lems of delay or expense although a few instances of "judge shop-
ping" were notable. Further, a requirement that the affidavit for
disqualification be certified by counsel of record as to both his and
62 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 51-2-8 (1966) provides: "that nothing herein contained
shall disqualify a judge who comes within the provision of this section to enter a
formal order designed merely to advance the cause towards a final hearing and not
requiring judicial action involving the merits of the case."
62 The West Virginia court has held that a writ of prohibition is the proper
procedure to use to disqualify a judge who has refused to disqualify himself. Os-
borne v. Chinn, 146 W. Va. 610, 121 S.E.2d 610 (1968).
"1 Pfizer Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 976 (1972).
1, [A] trial is not likely to proceed in a very satisfactory way if an
unsettled claim of judicial bias is an ever present source of tension and
irritation. Only a final ruling by a disinterested higher court before trial
can dispel this unwholesome aura. Thus, if an appellate court refused,
when properly petitioned, to prevent a disqualified judge from trying a
case, or to say that the challenged judge is not disqualified, this postpone-
ment of decision hurts the administration of justice, even though the
court reserves the right to pass upon the matter after trial.
Green v. Murphy, 259 F.2d 591, 595 (3d Cir. 1958) (concurring opinion).
's Federal Courts, supra note 9, at 1437.
6 JUDICIAL CoUNCI.L OF CALORNIA, NINErENTh BiENNALs REPoRT To TH GoVER-
NOR AND THE LEGIsLATUR 34-39 (1963).
'" CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 170.6 (Supp. 1965). As originally enacted in 1957, it
applied only to civil cases. It was extended to criminal cases in 1959.
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his client's good faith" and the fact that a litigant who knowingly
makes false allegations in an affidavit may be tried for perjury
would probably discourage most potential abusers of the system.
Further, a time requirement" providing that the affidavit be filed
before the trial of the case and allowing it after that, but before
final judgment, only if good cause be shown for the failure to file
the affidavit earlier" will prevent an applicant from waiting to see
whether the results of the trial will be favorable before filing the
affidavit and will also prevent, to a certain degree, the necessity
of a different judge's coming into the litigation already in progress.
The opponents of a system for automatic disqualification
upon allegation of bias or prejudice have argued that such a
preemptory system would result in a shortage of judges to try
cases.' Two West Virginia statutes largely negate this argument.
The first specifically provides that the attorneys in a case may
elect a special judge if the regular judge is disqualified for inter-
est,72 and the second provides for a suit to be brought in another
.. Section 144 of the Judicial Code requires the affidavit be certified by coun-
sel, which makes him subject to threat of contempt or disbarment proceedings. See
Laughlin v. United States, 151 F.2d 281 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 777
(1945).
The requirement that counsel certify his own good faith, as well as his client's
prevents an attorney from persuading his client that the judge is biased. In re Union
Leader Corp., 292 F.2d 381 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 927 (1961). See Federal
Courts, supra note 9, for a more comprehensive discussion of the certification by
counsel of the affidavit for disqualification.
" The need for a procedural safeguard such as a time requirement was recog-
nized and placed in both the Judicial Code and the West Virginia statute. However,
section 144 of the Judicial Code originally provided that an affidavit "be filed not
less than ten days before the beginning of the term at which the proceeding is to
be heard." 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1970). This became obsolete when Congress abolished
formal terms of court in 1963 and consequently was rendered ineffective without a
substitute being added. The courts, however, maintain a deadline in that the affi-
davit must be filed within a reasonable time and that reasonable time must be prior
to final judgment. E.g., Eisler v. United States, 170 F.2d 273 (D.C. Cir. 1948), cert.
dismissed, 338 U.S. 883 (1949); Bommarito v. United States, 61 F.2d 355 (8th Cir.
1932). See Federal Courts, supra note 9, at 1444. West Virginia's statute contains
a similar time requirement. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 51-2-8 (1966).
,o An example of "good cause," that would allow an affidavit to be filed after
the trial begins, would be the discovery of facts indicating a judge's bias.
"1 Disqualification, supra note 27, at 747.
72 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 51-2-10 (1966) provides:
When, for any cause, the judge of a circuit court, criminal court, or other
court of record of limited jurisdiction, shall fail to attend and hold the
same. . . or if he is in attendance and cannot properly preside at the trial
[Vol. 77
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court or circuit if the presiding judge is disqualified.73
An important requisite to any effective disqualification stat-
ute is that it include a list of specific categories of facts that are
most likely to cause bias of prejudice. It is far easier for a judge to
disqualify himself, and for the litigant to obtain recusal, when the
judge has no discretion at all in deciding whether his action or
situation is likely to cause bias. However, it is important that the
statute not be limited to those specific categories listed so that new
categories may be added by the courts when necessary. Such a list
of per se recusal grounds should include the common law grounds
of interest, relationship, and prior participation in a case, with the
addition of prejudgment of the merits. While prejudgment of the
facts at issue or the litigants before the judge must be sufficient
to require disqualification under any workable statute, prejudg-
ment of the law should not be and ordinarily has not been. 74 Merely
because a judge thinks a litigant's legal theory is wrong does not
mean he cannot conduct a fair and impartial trial; if his rulings
regarding the law are wrong, they can be discovered and over-
turned by appellate review.
An ideal statute insuring litigants a trial by a fair, impartial,
and disinterested judge must contain: (1) a preemptory system for
disqualification alleviating the appearance, as well as the exist-
ence, of bias; (2) certain specific grounds that indicate bias, in-
cluding, but not limited to, the common law categories; (3) a provi-
sion for disqualification for prejudgment of the merits of the case
and the law applicable to the particular facts of the case; and (4)
certain procedural safeguards to prevent abuse of such a preemp-
tory system, such as an affidavit alleging facts sufficient to indi-
of any cause ... the attorneys present and practicing in such court may
elect a judge by ballot to hold such court during the absence of the judge
thereof, or for the trial of the cause in which such judge cannot preside
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-1-1(g) (1966) provides: "If a judge of a circuit be
interested in a case which, but for such interest, would be proper for the jurisdiction
of his court, the action or suit may be brought in any county in an adjoining
circuit."
71 "In particular, views relating to legal questions, even strongly held views in
favor of law enforcement, do not amount to personal bias." United States v. Nehas
368 F.Supp. 435, 437 (W.D. Pa. 1973). But see Gladstein v. McLaughlin, 230 F.2d
762 (9th Cir. 1955), wherein the court held that a judge may make a statement
which, in form, is purely law but is so directly related to the particular facts of the
case as to require recusal on the basis that the judge has prejudged the merits of
the case.
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cate an appearance of bias, certification of that affidavit by coun-
sel, and a time requirement for filing the affidavit with sufficient
leeway for discovery of bias after trial begins." Today, when public
confidence in the workings of government and the legal system is
low, a competent, effective statute providing for disqualification
on the basis of the appearance of bias is needed to maintain the
11 A model statute for recusal of judges would resemble the ABA Code of
Judicial Conduct, Canon 3C, with a few changes. Such a statute might be:
(1)Whenever a party to a proceeding in any court of record makes and files an
affidavit, under penalty of perjury, alleging facts to be taken as true for purposes
of disqualification, whether or not they are in fact true, in which the judge's impar-
tiality might reasonably appear to be questioned, or alleges facts that indicate such
party cannot have a fair and impartial trial before such judge, the judge is disquali-
fied from hearing the case and can proceed no further. Facts indicating the appear-
ance of bias requiring recusal include, but are not limited to, the following instan-
ces:
(a) the judge has a personal bias or prejudice either against a party, or
in favor of any adverse party, or personal knowledge of disputed eviden-
tiary facts concerning the proceeding;
(b) the judge served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer
with whom he previously practiced law served during such association as
a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or such lawyer has been a
material witness concerning it;
(c) the judge knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse
or minor child residing in his household, has any financial interest, except
as a taxpayer, in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the
proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by
the outcome of the proceeding;
(d) the judge or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relation-
ship to either of them, or the spouse of such person:
(i) is acting as lawyer in the proceeding;
(ii) is known by the judge to have an interest that could be sub-
stantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;
(iii) is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness in
the proceeding;
(e) the judge applies the law to the particular facts of the case prior to
trial, constituting a fixed belief concerning the merits of the case not the
law itself.
(2)The affidavit must allege facts sufficient to indicate an appearance of im-
partiality, but the judge before whom the matter is pending shall have no power to
determine the truth or falsity of the allegations but must accept those allegations
as true. The affidavit must be filed timely, before trial, unless the alleged impartial-
ity was not discovered until after trial, and it shall be accompanied by a certificate
of counsel of record stating that it is made in good faith.
(3)Disqualification under this section shall not invalidate any order by such
judge designed merely to advance the case towards a final hearing and not requiring
judicial action involving the merits of the case.
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major sanction behind the operation of the judiciary-the public's
belief that, through it, disputes can be settled impartially,
reasonably, and fairly.
Don R. Sensabaugh, Jr.
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